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Proposals  that  would  establish  a  two-year  budget  and 
appropriations  cycle  for  the  U.S.  government  have  received 
increasing  attention  during  the  past  two  decades.  This  paper 
provides  a historical  overview  of such recommendations.  It also 
outlines  and  assesses  -- with  the aid of  evidence  that  includes 
results from state-level  studies -- arguments for and against this 
budget  reform.  While  acknowledging  that  the  budget  period  and 
process timeline do not determine the quality of policy outcomes by 
themselves, the author concludes that a two-year cycle is likely to 
offer  some  improvement  over  the present  system.  Expected  gains 
include  elimination  of  procedural  repetition,  and  increased 
opportunities  for program management, congressional oversight,  and 
long-range  planning.  This  reform  might  also  contribute  to both 
greater economic stability and efforts designed to achieve further 
deficit  reduction. Vice  President  Al  Gore's  National  Performance  Review  (NPR) 
report  --  From Red  Tape  to Results:  Creating  a Government  that 
works Better and Costs Less -- has called for the United States to 
adopt  a  two-year  federal  budget  by  1996  [Gore 1993,  171.  This 
paper  provides  a  historical  overview  of  proposals  for  biennial 
budgeting.  It also outlines and assesses arguments for and against 
this recommendation. 
The essay concludes that a two-year budget and appropriations 
cycle  is likely  to offer  a number of advantages  over  the present 
system.  During  the  biennium,  officials  in  Washington  should 
experience  a reduced budget workload.  The combination of a longer 
budget  period  with  this chance  to devote  additional  attention  to 
oversight  and  other  nonbudget  matters  is one  that  provides  new 
opportunities  for  making  policies  more  effective,  promoting 
economic  stability  and  perhaps  even  for  reducing  the  federal 
deficit.  But  we  should  not  expect  too  much  from  this  or  any 
process reform.  The best procedural  reforms will only facilitate, 
not ensure,  improved policy outcomes.  Moreover,  budget  decisions 
are  political  decisions  --  and  political  problems  are  rarely 
prevented  by procedural  revisions. 
Proposals 
Researchers  and  Washington  legislators  have  presented  a 
variety  of  biennial-budgeting  proposals  during  the  past  two 2 
decades.  This  section  discusses  five  recommendations  --  four 
congressional  bills and the Clinton Administration's  NPR proposal. 
An  examination  of  these suggestions  offers  insight  into both  the 
history  of  this  proposed  reform  and  the  diversity  of  alternate 
timetables.  We begin with Leon Panetta's  "Biennial Budgeting  Act 
of 1977." 
The Panetta Bill 
One of the first bills  seeking to put the U.S. government  On 
a two-year budget cycle was introduced in September of 1977 by Leon 
Panetta, then a first-term Congressman from California.  Panetta's 
bill  retained  the  general  framework  established  by  the  1974 
Congressional Budget Act, but stretched decision-making over a two- 
year period  and built  in time for congressional  0versight.l  "The 
congressional  budget  process  is now  little more  than a blueprint 
for  recurring  fiscal  crisisI1' he  stated  while  introducing  his 
proposal.  "The heart  of the problem  is the one-year  budget  time 
frame"  CPanetta 1977al.2 
Panetta's  "Biennial Budgeting Act of 1977" contained a budget 
schedule  that would begin with the President's  submission  of both 
a current  services  budget  and  a biennial  budget  at  the  start  of 
each two-year,  congressional  term.3  The first six months  of each 
congressional  term  would be devoted to formal oversight of programs 
and agencies  by  the committees  of each house.  During  the second 
six  months,  budget  committees  would  report  the  first  budget 
resolution  while  legislative  committees  would  report  all 
authorizing  legislation. 3 
In the first three months of the second year, Congress would 
first act on authorizing  bills and then on the first of two, two- 
year  budget  resolutions.  The  rest  of  the  second  year's  budget 
activity  would  focus  on  development  and  presentation  of  the 
Appropriations  Committees'  reports,  congressional  action  on 
appropriations  legislation,  and  passage  of  the  second  budget 
resolution.  Reconciliation  needed  to implement  the second budget 
resolution would be completed by September 25 -- and the biennial- 
budget  period would begin on October 1  [Panetta 1977a; 1977bl. 
Panetta  offered  a  number  of  arguments  in  support  of  his 
proposal.  "1 believe  this approach would give us the time we need 
to conduct  thorough review of the budget, curb wasteful  spending, 
and bring the bureaucracy under control," he wrote  [Panetta 197733, 
364061.  Among  other  benefits  suggested  by  Panetta  in 1977 were 
that  the  two-year  cycle  allows  for better  oversight  of  existing 
programs  and provides  state and local governments  (entities whose 
actions  are  often  dependent  upon  federal  support)  with  greater 
financial  security. 
Two final points are worth noting regarding  the Panetta bill 
before  moving  on to consider  other biennial-budgeting  proposals. 
First,  the  bill  permitted  rescissions  and  supplemental 
appropriations  during a budget cycle  [Panetta 1977b, 364071.  These 
would  allow  federal  officials  to  respond  in  the  event  of 
significant  economic  changes,  national  emergencies,  and  other 
unanticipated  developments.  Finally,  although  Panetta  was  the 
first  to  sponsor  legislation  of  this  sort,  he  noted  while 4 
introducing his proposal  that the approach was  "not entirely new." 
In  particular,  Panetta  noted  that  Senator  Warren  Magnuson  had 
proposed  separate  authorizing  and appropriating  periods  within  a 
single-year  fiscal  period;  that  other  members  of  Congress  had 
suggested  that the two-year approach bears examination;  and that a 
study  conducted  by  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO)  "was 
largely  favorable  and  it  recommended  that  the  Appropriations 
Committees  begin  immediately by examining  the budget  for programs 
that could be most  easily  switched  to a two-year  cycle"  [Panetta 
1977a, 290161. 
The Ford Bill 
Panetta  introduced  his  proposal  regularly  in  the  years 
following 1977.  By 1981 he had 35 cosponsors.  In addition,  in the 
fall  of  that  year  Kentucky's  Senator  Wendell  Ford  introduced  a 
similar proposal. 
The  Ford  bill  was  introduced  at  a  time  of  great  budgetary 
chaos.  In fact, when Ford spoke on the Senate floor on behalf  of 
his  bill  late  in  November  of  1981,  he  noted  that  none  of  the 
regular appropriations  bills had been enacted yet; that the second 
budget resolution had not even been reported out of committee;  and 
that President Reagan's veto was blocking a continuing resolution. 
Ford's conclusion: 
In my  opinion,  the  tragic  stalemate  we  have 
reached  in providing  funds  for the operation 
of the Government  stems quite largely from our 
retention of the archaic annual budget  system -- a system which simply does not afford  time 
for the executive and legislative branches  to 
budget and appropriate effectively  [Ford 1981, 
288281. 
Like  Panetta,  Ford  reintroduced  his  proposal  in  subsequent 
years.  In  1983,  for  example,  Ford had  10 cosponsors,  including 
Senators Dan Quayle, Nancy Kassebaum, Dale Bumbers,  Sam Nunn,  and 
Paul Tsongas. Major differences between the 1983 Ford bill and the 
aforementioned  Panetta bill were as follows:  Ford scheduled action 
on  the  first  budget  resolution  by  July  31  of  the  first 
congressional  session  -- eight months before  such action would be 
mandated  by  Panetta's  proposal;  Ford  would  require  the  bulk  of 
legislative  oversight  to occur  during  Congress's  second  session; 
and  Ford  allowed  more  time  for preparation  and  consideration  of 
reconciliation  (i.e., his bill would complete action on the second 
budget resolution more than a month before the date set by Panetta) 
[American Enterprise  Institute  (AEI) 1983, 6-101.4 
The Roth Bill 
Another  federal legislator proposing a biennial budget  in the 
early 1980s was Delaware  Senator William Roth.  Upon reintroducing 
his  proposal  in January  of  1985,  Roth  noted,  "It is  clear  that 
there  is  growing  momentum  for  a  two-year  budget  process"  [Roth 
1985,  691.  In particular,  he noted  that the Senate Governmental 
Affairs  Committee  had  recently  held  hearings  during  which  Alice 
Rivlin  (the CBO's  first  director),  Charles  Bowsher  (Comptroller 
General)  and  others  testified  favorably  on  the  legislation.  He b 
also noted that the National Association of Public Administration, 




the two-year budget  concept. 
Roth proposal  would  have Congress  prepare  and approve  a 
budget  during  the  first year  of  each  new  congressional 
term.  This  bill  required  action  on  a  single,  binding  budget 
resolution  by  May  31.  It  also  required  action  on  a  two-year, 
omnibus  appropriation  bill  by  October  15.  The  biennial  fiscal 
period would begin January 1 just prior to the start of Congressls 
second session  -- a session devoted to oversight and consideration 
of authorizations. 
Roth  noted  that  this  timetable  would  not  only  provide  more 
time for oversight but also permit each new President and Congress 
"to  put  their  policies  into  place  in  the  first  year  of  their 
respective  terms."  In contrast, under the Panetta and Ford bills, 
budget decisions would not go into effect until only a month before 
the election of a new Congress  [Roth 1985, 69-703.  Like the other 
bills  discussed  so  far,  however,  Roth's  proposal  would  permit 
supplemental  appropriations. 
The Hutto Bill 
Yet another version of the two-year budget has been offered by 
Congressman  Earl Hutto of Florida.  This bill offers still another 
date for the start of the budget period  -- October  1 of the first 
congressional  session. 
In 1985, Hutto  explained his proposal  as follows: 
Unlike  previous  bills  that  have  been 7 
introduced,  under  our  proposal,  the Congress 
will  complete  all  authorizing  and 
appropriating  actions during the first year of 
the cycle.  A single concurrent  resolution  on 
the budget for the two fiscal year period will 
be  completed  by  May  15  [of  the  first 
congressional  session].  The  second  year  of 
the  cycle  will  be  devoted  to  planning, 
evaluation, oversight and supplemental funding 
and  emergency  authorization  [Hutto  1985, 
11421. 
Speaking  for himself,  and  cosponsors  Les Aspin,  Trent  Lott,  and 
James  Courter,  Hutto  added:  "We believe  the primary  issue  for 
[this] Congress  is to get a handle on Federal spending, and we are 
convinced  that  going  to  a  two-year  budgeting  cycle  will  help 
considerably"  [Hutto  1985,  11421.  The  Congressional  Record 
indicates  at  least  22  additional  sponsors  were  added  to Hutto's 
bill  in early  1985. 
The NPR Proposal 
The "growing momentum" for a biennial budget that Senator Roth 
noted  in 1985 appears  to have continued  to the present.  National 
Journal,  a weekly  news magazine  devoted  to national  politics  and 
policy,  drew  attention  to  the  issue  in  a  September  1986  story 
entitled  "Biennial Budgeting Taking Root."  In the story, reporter 
Jonathan  Rauch  stated  that  to  call  the  present  budget  process 
"time-consuming  or  inefficient  hardly  does  it  justice."  He 8 
suggested both that biennial budgeting would be an improvement  and 
that "the idea is likely to keep appearing, given that the annual 
budget  has  seemed  to become  almost  interminable  in recent years" 
[Rauch 1986, 23191. 
Rauch's  article  identified  a  number  of  biennial-budgeting 
supporters,  including Gerald Miller of the National Association  of 
State  Budget  Officers  (NASBO),  then White  House  chief  of  staff 
Donald  Regan,  and Senator  Pete Domenici  of New Mexico.  In fact, 
Domenici  -- the ranking Republican  of the Senate Budget Committee 
_ -  underscored  his  support  for  a  two-year  budget  cycle  in  a 
Washington  Post  op-ed  essay  in  January  of  the  following  year 
[Domenici 19871.  Others expressing support for biennial budgeting 
since  1986  include:  Senators  Charles  Robb  and  David  Boren; 
Congressmen  William  Gray,  Frank  Horton,  Ralph  Regula,  and  Jamie 
Whitten;  James  Miller,  Director  of  the Office  of Management  and 
Budget  (OMB)  during  the  Reagan  Administration;  Nicholas  Brady, 
Treasury  Secretary  for  the  Reagan  and  Bush  Administrations;' 
Democratic  members  of the 1988-1989 National  Economic  Commission; 
economists  Lawrence  Chimerine  (of Chase Econometrics),  Ronald Utt 
(of the  U.S.  Chamber  of  Commerce),  Charles  Schultze  and  Murray 
Weidenbaum;  and policy-scholars  Aaron Wildavsky  and Thomas Lynch.6 
The Clinton Administration's  1993 NPR report notes that seven 
out  of  ten members  of  Congress  now  favor  a budget  process  with 
multi-year  authorizations  and a biennial budget  resolution.  With 
biennial budgets, the report suggests, legislators and other public 
officials  "might spend more time examining which programs actually 9 
work."  Moreover,  NPR  argues  that  annual  budgets  "consume  an 
enormous  amount  of  management  time  --  time  not  spent  serving 
customers"  [Gore 1993, 171. 
The  NPR  report  recommends  biennial  budget  resolutions  and 
appropriations  and multi-year  authorizations.  It calls  for  the 
first biennium  to begin on October  1, 1996 and cover fiscal years 
1997  and  1998.  The  report  also  states:  "In  off  years,  the 
President  would  submit  only  amendments  for  exceptional  areas  Of 
concern,  emergencies,  or  other  unforeseen  circumstances"  [Gore 
1993, 171.  Since that report was published,  the Joint Committee on 
the  Organization  of  Congress  expressed  bipartisan  support  for 
biennial  budgeting  and  at  least  three  new  bills  have  been 
introduced  before  Congress  [Cohen 1994,  33;  "At a Glance"  1994, 
3761. 
Review 
The preceding  discussion provides  evidence of the wide  range 
of proposals  that have been developed  in an effort to establish  a 
two-year  federal budget  cycle.  The  five proposals  discussed  are 
not  a  comprehensive  catalogue  of  alternatives.'  Still,  they 
present  a variety  of  recommendations  regarding  the  start  of  the 
budget  period  and  the  timing  and/or  frequency  of  congressional 
action  with  respect  to  authorizations,  appropriations,  budget 
resolutions and legislative oversight  (see  Table 1 for a comparison 
of  these proposals).  One must  keep  this array  of variables  and 
combinations  in mind when  evaluating  the arguments  of both  those 
who advocate  and oppose biennial budgeting. 10 
TABLE  1 
BIENNIAL  BUDGETING  PROPOSALS  COMPARED 
no  X  Xa 
Designated 
Congressional Oversight  not 
Period:  stated 
in 1st Session  1st 6 
months 
in 2nd Session  X  X  X 
The First Full 
Congressional 
Session Covered by a 
New Biennium: 
1st Session  X  X  X 
2nd Session  X  X 
Biennium Begins: 
October 1  X  X  X  X 
January 1  X 
Allows Rescissions and 
Supplemental 
Appropriations? 
yes  X  X  X  X  X 
no 
"Unlike  the Roth  bill, this  proposal permits spending  authorizations during the 
second year of a biennium only in emergencies. Issues 
11 
This  section  is divided  into two parts.  Part  one  presents 
arguments  made  in favor of  a two-year  federal  budget.  Part  two 
identifies  arguments  against  this process  reform.  The  following 
section  (lVEvaluationl')  will assess these arguments by considering 
both  evidence  from  state-level  studies  and  the views  of  federal 
budgeting  participants  and observers.* 
Arguments  for Biennial  Budgets 
Supporters  argue  that  a  two-year  budget  and  appropriations 
cycle  would  streamline  the  budget  process  by  eliminating  much 
procedural  repetition.  They  suggest  this  cycle  will  also  make 
federal policies more effective.  In particular, proponents  suggest 
biennial  budgeting  allows public  officials  more  time for program 
oversight and goal-setting; encourages serious long-range planning; 
helps  improve  the  quality  of  budget  debates  and  decisions;  and 
enables better integration of policy needs and fiscal objectives.g 
Supporters  also maintain  that  such  a  system  would  engender 
greater  economic  stability  than we have at present.  For example, 
they suggest  that less frequent  changes  in taxes and expenditure 
programs would reduce uncertainty  and prevent disruptions  that are 
often costly  to both the public and private  sectors.  At the same 
time, legislators would have a better opportunity to consider major 
policy  changes and new programs. 
Finally, many advocates of this approach believe it would make 
budget-deficit  reduction  easier  to achieve.  There  are  at  least 
three  reasons  offered  in  support  of  this  perspective.  First, 12 
multi-year  targets might be more easily set and met because change 
could  be  imposed  gradually.  Second,  the  system  would  give 
officials  fewer chances  to scrap or modify  long-term  strategies. 
Third,  biennial  budgets  would  reduce  the number  of opportunities 
for legislators  and organized  interests  to press  for enactment  of 
special projects. 
Arquments  aqainst Biennial  Budqets 
Opponents  argue that biennial budgets will not make budgeting 
any easier.  The  inherent  difficulty  of making  budget  choices  in 
the face of competing economic interests, priorities  and political 
alliances  ensures  that meeting  deadlines  will  continue  to  be  a 
prob1em.l'  Further,  Congress's  attention  to the budget  will  not 
be reduced, for legislators will expand the debate to fill whatever 
time is available. 
In fact, opponents suggest a two-year budget period means more 
budget  work  throughout  the  cycle.  There  is  more  work  in  the 
preparation  stage  because  officials  would  need  to  forecast 
budgetary  needs  for two years.  But there is also more work  after 
a budget  is  enacted  -- because  changing  economic  conditions  and 
unexpected  demands  would  lead  to frequent budget  adjustments  and 
greater  use  of  supplemental  appropriations.  Such  tinkering, 
opponents  argue, would  be  inevitable  due to the unreliability  of 
two-year  budget  projections.  Opponents  also note  that mid-cycle 
revisions  do  not  merely  mean  more  work  -- they  also  complicate 
planning  and undermine  economic  stability. 
Some  suggest  that  biennial  budgeting  reduces  congressional 13 
control over both the budget and the executive branch.  There have 
even  been  concerns  expressed  regarding  the  difficulty  of 
apportioning  funds over a two-year period.  One is that a desire to 
avoid  a shortage  of funds at the end of a two-year  fiscal period 
might encourage agencies to seek even greater funding levels.  This 
strategy, and the reduced accuracy of fiscal estimates, could make 
deficit  reduction  even more difficult. 
Another  argument  against  this  form of budgeting  is  that  it 
causes  us  to  lose  an  important  feature  of  the  present  system: 
flexibility.  The fact that economic priorities and policies may be 
maintained  for  two  years  at  a  time  leads  some  to  argue  that  a 
biennial  system will  be  insufficiently  responsive  to the public. 
Flexibility  seems  especially  important  in  the  realm  of 
appropriations.  Many recent analyses have expressed support for a 
biennial  budget  resolution  and  multi-year  authorizations  while 
rejecting  two-year appropriations  for precisely  this reason.ll 
The  timing  of  the  start of  a biennial-budget  period  is yet 
another  problem.  Opponents  argue  that a budget  period  beginning 
during  the  first  congressional  session  would  be  inappropriate 
because  it would  require  too much  too soon.  But they also argue 
that a budget period that commences later would create problems  as 
well.  In particular,  it would make  newly-elected  officials  wait 
even longer before they could shape a budget consistent with their 
campaign  pledges.  Indeed,  some  biennial-budget  proposals  would 
establish  a  system  whereby  one  Congress  appropriates  funds  for 
nearly the entire duration of the next Congress.  As a study by one 14 
congressional  committee  noted  in 1987,  "The delayed  impact  of  a 
biennial  budget  would  probably  be  felt hardest  by  the members  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  where  the  election  cycles  are  the 
shortest"  [House 1987, 121. 
Two  final  concerns  noted  by  opponents  of  two-year  budget 
proposals  are as follows.  First,  as Robert  Reischauer  warned  in 
1985, "mandating a radical change in the scope or the timetable of 
the process  could lead to its collapseI' [quoted in AEI 1983, 21.12 
Finally,  some  maintain  that  talk  about  budget-process  reform 
detracts  from the more pressing  task of constructing  a meaningful 
one-year  budget  for  the next  fiscal  year.  Those  who  view  next 
year's  budget  as  their  top  priority  consider  discussions  of 
biennial  budgets  to be an annoying distraction.13 
Evaluation 
Assessment  of Arguments  for Biennial Budgets 
I.  Streamlining  the Process 
In the  1983 edition  of Public Budgeting  Systems,  Robert  Lee 
and  Ronald  Johnson  wrote  that  the  major  problem  with  annual 
budgeting  is that little "breathing time" is available:  "both the 
executive  and legislative branches  are continuously  in the throes 
of  budgeting."  In  contrast,  they  concluded  that  the  biennial 
approach  "relieves participants  of many routine budget matters  and 
may allow greater  time for more  thorough analysis of governmental 
activities"  [Lee and Johnson  1983,  631.  Many other  observers  -- 
see, for example  Wiggins  and Hamm  [1984, III-20 and V-61  -- have 
reported  similar  findings and conclusions  throughout  the past  two decades. 
15 
One of  these observers  is Alice Rivlin,  now  the director  at 
OMB.  Rivlin has for years argued that the present process  causes 
officials  to  "spend enormous  amounts of time going over  the same 
decisions"  --  often  leaving  us  little  time  for  other  matters 
[quoted in Rauch  1986, 2319; Rivlin  19811.  She acknowledges  that 
although  biennial  budgeting  would  not make  decisions  any  easier, 
"at least you wouldn't  have to do them as often"  [quoted in House 
1987, 911.14 
In  fact,  since  deadlines  are  often  missed  and  budget 
preparation  begins more  than a year in advance, problems  with our 
process  often  go  beyond  fighting  the  same  battles  again  and 
again-l'  As  Rivlin's  predecessor,  Panetta,  noted  during 
congressional  testimony  in October of 1993, 
While we haggle over the details of the remaining several 
Fiscal  Year  1994 appropriations  bills,  the OMB and  the 
various  departments  and agencies are already devoting  a 
substantial  amount  of  their  time  and  resources  to  the 
development  of  the President's  fiscal year  1995 budget 
[Panetta 1993, 21. 
A two-year budget, Panetta concluded, "would undoubtedly 
amount of resources put into budgeting"  [Panetta 1993, 
Senator Pete Domenici agrees.  In his January 1987 
Post essay, he wrote: 
reduce the 
21  - 
Washington 
There  is no  reform  that will  substitute  for 
the responsibility of the individual committee 16 
or  member  to  conduct  the  business  of 
government  in  an  orderly  or  timely  manner. 
But  there  are  changes  that  could  lessen  the 
burdens  of  the  current  procedures  [Domenici 
1987, A131. 
According  to Domenici,  Congress  spends  about  90  percent  of  the 
annual appropriations  process in activity that "is a repetition of 
the previous  year's work"  [Rauch 1986, 23181.  Domenici would put 
an end to this practice: 
[We  ought to let members of Congress  spend a 
year doing other business and a year doing the 
business of the fiscal policy of the nation.  . 
.  .  I see no reason why we couldn't do it all 
[i.e. the budget  work]  on a two-year  cycle," 
[quoted in Rauch 1986, 23181. 
A  1987  National  Journal  article  on  budget-reform  proposals 
indicated  that  biennial  budgeting  had  considerable  support  in 
Congress  and  "is  widely  viewed  as  important  to  unclogging  the 
overburdened  budget  process"  [Haas 1987,  17141.16  This  view  is 
supported  by  a House  of  Representatives  report  on  budget-reform 
hearings  held  in  the  Spring  of  1987.  Numerous  witnesses  and 
legislators  participating  in these hearings  argued  that biennial 
budgets  would  indeed reduce  the time federal officials  devote  to 
budgeting  [House 19871.17 
Their  conclusion  is  also  shared  by  Susan  Irving,  a  budget 
specialist at the General Accounting Office  (GAO), and James Blum, 17 
deputy  director  of  the  CBO.  During  congressional  testimony  in 
March of 1994, Irving observed that much of the budget work inside 
government  agencies  "is  repetitious"  and  that  "the  savings  in 
agency  time could be significant" under a biennial budget  [Irving 
1994, 71.  Blumls  remarks at the same hearing  indicated  that two- 
year budgeting would be beneficial to executive agencies because it 
would  enable  managers  to  focus  their  time  and  attention  more 
effectively on management,  evaluation and planning  [Blum 1994, 61. 
GAO research on state experiences with biennial  budgets  also 
provides  support  for  this  view.  A  1989  report  issued  by  the 
Comptroller  General  noted  that  in  the  states  with  biennial 
budgeting,  tloff-year  budget  adjustments  did  not  consume  as much 
time as regular budgeting,  leaving more time for other legislative 
activities"  [GAO 1989b, 281.  Additional  evidence  is contained  in 
a  1987  GAO  survey-based  study  that  examined  state  budget-period 
changes  since  1967.  Among  its  findings  are  the  following: 
officials in most of the states changing to annual budgets reported 
significant  increases  in executive  and legislative  time spent on 
budgeting  activities;"  and most  officials  in states  changing  to 
biennial budgets reported an increase in the time devoted to their 
nonbudgeting  activities  [GAO  19871.  The 1987 study also notes that 
nearly all officials in states with annual legislative sessions and 
biennial  budgets  reported  that  their  legislature  devotes 
significantly  less time to budget matters in the off-year relative 
to  the  year  in  which  a  budget  is  approved  --  and  2/3  of  the 
respondents indicated that in the off-year their legislature spends 18 
"much less" time in such activities  [GAO 1987, 29l.l' 
Finally,  the  assertion  that  biennial  budgeting  would  be 
impractical  at the federal level is rejected categorically  by the 
executive director of the body representing state budget officers. 
NASBO's  Miller  argues  that many  state  budgets  are  every  bit  as 
complex as the federal budget, and he concurs with those who argue 
that  biennial  budgeting  would  significantly  reduce  work  on  the 
federal budget  in Washington  [Rauch 1986, 23191. 
II.  Making  Policies More Effective 
Would  a  streamlined  process  improve  oversight,  program 
management,  policy  analysis and planning?  The answer, of course, 
depends in part on executive and legislative-branch  leadership and 
the demands  officials  place  on public  agencies  [Irving 1993,  51. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  grounds  for  believing  that  biennial 
budgeting will have a positive influence on both fiscal policy and 
other  realms of federal decision-making  and action. 
For example, the current budget process is widely viewed as a 
major  obstacle  to  making  policies  more  effective.  Members  of 
Congress  and  outside  observers  both  maintain  that  the  present 
process expects the impossible in terms of simultaneous analyses of 
budgets  and  existing  and  proposed  programs.  As  a  result,  Ford 
argues, legislators make poor, hasty decisions  -- "with inadequate 
consideration  of  the  need  or  the  consequences"  [AEI 1983,  11.20 
In  fact,  a  1984  GAO  study  analyzed  perceptions  regarding  the 
federal  budgeting  workload  and  the  crowding-out  of  time  for 
oversight  and other  activities.  The  report  concluded  that  "the 19 
problems  are serious and need to be solvedI  [Bowsher 1984, 91.21 
While  biennial  budgeting  will  not  solve  these  problems  by 
itself,  officials  working  with  a  two-year  process  will  at  least 
have  an opportunity  to devote more  time and resources  toward  the 
improvement  of  public  policy.  It will  also  alleviate  problems 
caused by the current need to prepare budgets without knowledge of 
action on previous ones.  Moreover, it may also reduce the benefits 
that special interests gain from the hurried nature of the present 
process. 
State-level  experience provides  another reason for believing 
that policies  can be made  more  effective  by  adopting  a biennial 
budget.  According  to the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL),  advantages  of  biennial  state  budgets  are  that  they 
encourage  greater  attention  to program  review  and evaluation  and 
are conducive  to long-term planning.22  A NCSL policy brief on the 
subject adds that such budgets enhance stability in state agencies 
[Snell 1993; Snell testimony  in House 1993, 88; Eckl 1993, 21. 
Research  by  the GAO  and  Council  of  State  Governments  (CSG) 
supports  these views.  For example, the GAO indicates  that states 
changing  to  an  annual  budget  report  problems  including  adverse 
impacts  on  budget  execution,  program  analysis,  and  long-range 
planning.  States  adopting  a biennial  system,  meanwhile,  report 
positive  developments  in these areas  [GAO 19871.  Similar findings 
in states  with  biennial  budgets  are  reported  in both  a  1982 GAO 
paper  and  a  1972  CSG  study  [GAO  1982;  CSG  19721.  These 
considerations  led Connecticut to adopt two-year budgeting in 1992. 20 
III.  Promoting  Economic  Stability 
As  we  have  already  mentioned,  biennial  state  budgets 
contribute  to agency stability.  In fact, evidence  indicates  that 
annual  budgeting  "encourages  short-term  fiscal  decisions,"  while 
biennial  budgeting  causes  both  executive-branch  officials  and 
legislators  "to consider  the  long-range  implicationsff of  budget 
requests and program operations  [GAO 1987, 14, 221.  This suggests 
similar  outcomes  could be obtained  at the federal  level as well. 
But agency performance  is actually only one of many dimensions  to 
the  matter  of  stability  under  two-year  budgeting.  Issues  here 
range from the question of whether biennial budgeting  will  reduce 
the use  of  continuing  resolutions,  to the possibility  that  such 
budgets  may  encourage  private-sector  actors  to  adopt  longer 
decision-making  time horizons. 
Some  have  suggested  that  a  biennial  system  would  make  it 
easier  to meet  budget  deadlines  and  thus eliminate  the need  for 
continuing  resolutions  to  prevent  funding  gaps.  While  a 
streamlined  process might make meeting  deadlines  somewhat  easier, 
members  of  the  House  Committee  on  Government  Operations  were 
certainly  correct when they stated in 1987 that biennial budgeting 
would  not necessarily  eliminate  these missed  deadlines  and gaps. 
Nevertheless,  as the committee also observed, such budgeting would 
"reduce  the  frequency  with  which  those  deadlines  are  faced  and 
therefore  reduce  the number  of times that Congress  would  have  to 
face continuing resolutions and government shutdowns"  [House 1987, 
101  . 21 
Proponents of biennial budgeting also argue that an important 
benefit of such a system would be increased financial security for 
state  and  local  governments.  In  fact,  many  states  adopting  an 
annual budget  in the past few decades have done so partly to allow 
a quick response to federal policy changes; and community officials 
have  long been  concerned  that the vagaries  of the federal budget 
process make local budgeting difficult  [Eckl 1993; CSG 1972; Moore 
19861.  Unless  combined with some form of advance budgeting,  two- 
year  federal  budgets  would,  of  course,  bring  greater  funding 
certainty  to states and localities only every other year.  Still, 
the  fact  that  this reform  is a step  in the direction  of greater 
stability  cannot be ignored. 
According to NASBO's Miller, two-year federal budgeting  "would 
be a positive  step, not only for the federal government,  but also 
for  the  states  that  have  to  deal  with  the  federal  government" 
[quoted in Rauch  1986, 23191.  A study considering  the impact of 
federal  budgeting  on  states,  conducted  for  the  CBO  by  the 
accounting  firm of Peat, Marwick,  and Mitchell  during  the 197Os, 
led  that  Office  to  the  same  conclusion  [Panetta  1977a,  290161. 
Moreover, states, local governments and other recipients of federal 
money were identified as among the "main beneficiaries"  of biennial 
budgeting by the CBO's Reischauer during 1993 testimony on the NPR 
proposal  [Reischauer 1993, 5-61. 
The  added 
have a positive 
notes: 
stability  of biennial  budgets  would  probably  also 
impact on other realms of fiscal policy.  As Rivlin 22 
Too frequent changes can be counterproductive. 
Transfer  payments  need  to be  predictable  so 
that  peoples'  lives  are  not  disrupted. 
Military  capability  suffers if signals change 
too often.  Procurement  costs  can go up,  not 
down,  if  production  lines  are  alternately 
speeded  up,  slowed  down,  or  even  halted 
pending  Congressional  action.  .  .  .  Indeed, 
almost  all  programs  would  work  better  if 
authorizations and appropriations were enacted 
for several years  at a time.  About  the only 
exceptions  are  disaster  assistance,  military 
contingencies,  or  countercyclical  programs 
where triggering mechanisms are not applicable 
[quoted in Ford 1981, 289541.23 
Moreover,  while  multi-year  budgeting  provides  fewer  scheduled 
opportunities  for policy changes than an annual process, Wildavsky 
observes  that the former permits larger changes "to be effected  in 
a more orderly way"  [Wildavsky 1988, 4151. 
The  macroeconomy  might  also  be  more  stable  in  an  era  of 
biennial  budgeting.  This  is especially  true if public  officials 
prepare for future cyclical fluctuations by increasing reliance on 
policies  triggered  by  economic  conditions  and  on  other  forms  of 
automatic  stabilizers.  Even with off-year  inflation adjustments, 
biennial  budgets  should allow participants  in financial  and other 
markets  to experience not only reduced policy uncertainty  but also 23 
greater  aggregate-demand  stability.24  While  political  economists 
have  long  been  concerned  about  the  destabilizing  effects  of 
unanticipated  monetary  fluctuations,  we  should  not  ignore  the 
similarly  disruptive  impact of  frequent  and unpredictable  fiscal 
policy changes  -- especially in the present era of "Big Government" 
capitalism.25 
Finally,  a two-year budget would make  it somewhat easier  for 
corporations  to  extend  their  own  planning  horizons.  The 
Competitiveness  Policy Council, M.I.T.'s Commission  on Industrial 
Productivity,  and other  research  teams have  recently  underscored 
the  need  to  extend  decision-making  vistas  and  end  America's 
preoccupation  with  short-term  results.  Biennial  budgeting  can 
contribute  to  this  important  determinant  of  improved  U.S. 
competitiveness  [Competitiveness Policy Council 1992; Dertouzos  et 
al. 1989; Porter 19921.26 
IV.  Reducing  the Deficit 
A number of features of two-year budgeting might help  reduce 
the federal deficit.  These include reduced opportunities  for each 
of  the  following:  alteration  of  long-range  strategies;  use  of 
year-end  budget  gimmicks;  and  capitulation  to  the  demands  of 
special interests  [House 1987, 89; Wiggins and Hamm 1984, V-5; CSG 
1972,  131.  But  since  procedural  reform  is  no  substitute  for 
political  will,  we  should  not  expect  too  much  in  this  realm. 
Nevertheless,  two additional  aspects  of biennial  budgeting  might 
provide  especially  helpful  if  the  will  is  indeed  there.  One, 
mentioned  above,  is the increased opportunity  for oversight.  The 24 
other  is  that  a  decision  taking  effect  in  two  years  "could  be 
easier for people  to adjust to than one that takes effect in a few 
months"  [Panetta, quoted  in Kilborn 1988, B81."7 
Assessment  of Arguments  against Biennial Budgets 
I.  Budgeting  Will Remain Difficult 
Wildavsky has written that budgeting "lies at the heart of the 
political  processl' [Wildavsky 1988, 81.  Since this process  is a 
key  mechanism  by  which  citizens  seek  to  resolve  conflicts  of 
interests and priorities, budgeting will indeed remain difficult  -- 
especially in the present era of problems that require tough fiscal 
choices.  But while biennial-budgeting  supporters acknowledge  that 
"procedural changes will not make these choices easier," one finds 
very  few  observers  who  see  no  benefit  in  a  streamlined  process 
[Rivlin 1984, 137; Kilborn  1988, B81. 
II.  Budget Work Will  Increase 
Since  both  the  President's  budget  and  congressional  budget 
resolutions now contain multi-year estimates, budget preparation  in 
a biennial  system will not increase as much as some fear.  In fact, 
OMB officials report that numbers in the President's budget "are as 
precisely  worked  out as for the fiscal year at hand and  serve as 
the  ceilings  for  the  next  year's  budget  request"  [Rauch  1986, 
23191.  Further,  while  moving  to a  two-year  system  is likely  to 
both produce less accurate fiscal forecasts and cause some increase 
in budget  adjustments,  state  experience  discussed  above  suggests 
that considerable  workload  reductions  can still be  found  in off- 
years.28  Moreover,  as many  observers  note,  "the reality  is  that 25 
changes  in  hundreds  of  accounts  are  relatively  small  and 
predictable"  [Panetta 1993, 21.  In short, work under  a biennial 
process is unlikely to come close to the burden of an annual budget 
and appropriations  cycle  [Panetta 1993, 5; Panetta 1977b, 364071.2g 
But  what  of  the  fear  that  Congress  will  expand  the budget 
debate to fill whatever  time is allotted?  Since there is probably 
some  merit  to  this  argument,  federal  officials  might  choose  to 
follow  the lead of  states  and avoid biennial-budgeting  proposals 
that  stretch  the process  out over  two years.  In fact, one  finds 
that what  some  have  called  the  "split-sessions"  approach  (which 
devotes  an  entire  session  to oversight)  is  found  in  nearly  all 
recent proposals  for a two-year budget.  The Roth bill  discussed 
above  comes  the  closest  to  offering  a  compromise  between  the 
"stretch*'  and l'split-sessionsV'  alternatives in that it would allow 
more budget  attention  during a single session by moving  the start 
of the fiscal year to January 1.  This change could be quite useful 
since current  law requires  a newly-elected  President  to submit  a 
full budget within  two weeks of inauguration. 
III.  Reducing  Control 
The  concern  over  reduced  congressional  control  presumes 
control  exists at present; but many argue that the budget process 
itself has  taken control of Congress  for well over a decade.  By 
streamlining  the process  and providing  an opportunity  to improve 
policies through greater oversight and planning, biennial budgeting 
may actually  help give members of Congress a chance  to both exert 
greater  control  over  public-sector  activity  and  consider  more 26 
carefully  the  budget's  impact  on  the  economy.30  In  fact,  views 
similar to this have been expressed by both CBO and GAO researchers 
[Panetta  1977a,  29016;  GAO  1989b,  281.31  The  points  to  be 
underscored here are that congressional llcontroll'  must be conceived 
as involving  more  than the frequency with which  budget  decisions 
are  made,  and  that  control  in  that  narrow  sense  comes  at  the 
expense  of  lost opportunities  for greater  economic  stability  and 
efficiency.32 
IV.  Budget-Period  Problems 
Choosing a starting date for the budget period is difficult  -- 
especially  if one seeks to avoid a process that reverts back to an 
annual  one due  to political  pressure  for supplementals  and other 
policy  changes.  While  the NPR recommends  that the biennium  begin 
October  1  of  even-numbered  years,  most  federal  proposals  (and 
states with biennial budgeting)  call instead for two-year budgets 
that  take  effect  before  the  start  of  the  legislature's  second 
session.  In her 1993 testimony,  Irving indicated  the GAO prefers 
an  arrangement  that  concentrates  budget  activity  in  the  first 
session  of  each  Congress  and  oversight  in  the  second.  As  she 
explained: 
Under  this approach,  the biennium would begin October  1 
of odd-numbered  years, and thus budgets would be adopted 
during  the first year of a President's  term and at the 
start  of  each  new  Congress.  This  would  prevent  a 
situation  in which  a new  Congress  and  a new  President 
would  face the prospect  of operating  for nearly  2 years 27 
under  an  earlier  approved  budget.  Otherwise,  the 
pressure  for  major  changes  in  the  off-year  would  be 
great.33 
Approving  a new budget during Congress's  first session makes 
sense.  To accommodate  those who worry that this arrangement would 
require  too much budget action too soon, legislators might  choose 
to move  the  start  of  the biennium  to January  1 of  even-numbered 
years  --  as recommended  in a 1984 report submitted  to Congress  by 
Bowsher  [Bowsher 1984, 61.  This would still offer the benefits of 
the approach  described by Irving. 
V.  Other Concerns 
There is no reason to expect that biennial budgeting will lead 
to a collapse of the budget process.  In fact, even reduced budget 
flexibility  should  not  be  a  major  concern  because  supplemental 
appropriations,  rescissions  and other  adjustments  can be made  in 
the event of changing circumstances  that require immediate  action 
[Panetta 1993, 2].34  Further,  as Rivlin  [1981, 371 suggests,  our 
present  budgeting  system is one that permits  too much  flexibility 
and  suffers  from  too  little  stability,  continuity  and  policy 
planning.35  Indeed,  fluctuations  caused  by  changing  economic 
conditions  can  often  be  addressed  effectively  by  increasing  our 
reliance  on  automatic  triggering  mechanisms  (as mentioned  above) 
and  shifting  our  focus  toward  cyclically-adjusted  (or  "high- 
employment") measures of budget deficits.  By taking these steps to 
introduce  increased  I1rigidityll  into the budget process,  officials 
might be liberated  in a way that permits greater  attention  to the 28 
more  fundamental  challenges  confronting  our society. 
Finally there is the concern of those who view discussions  of 
biennial budgeting as an annoying distraction  --  a distraction  from 
the more pressing  task of crafting a meaningful one-year budget for 
the  next  fiscal  year.  The  fact  that  this  concern  has  been 
expressed  by  legislators  in November  (see Kilborn  119881)  speaks 
volumes about the present process  -- though the message  is not the 
one intended by those who voice it.  An expression of this concern 
so  soon  in  the  fiscal  year  suggests  there  is  indeed  a  need  to 
streamline  the budget process. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has traced the history of proposals  for a two-year 
federal budget.  It has also outlined  and assessed  the arguments 
for  and  against  this  budget-process  reform.  While  one  might 
propose a budget period that differs from that proposed  in the NPR 
report  -- indeed,  approving  a  two-year  budget  during  the  first 
congressional  session  (and  perhaps moving the start of the biennium 
to January  1) seems  superior  to what NPR proposes  -- this author 
concludes  that the U.S. government  should adopt a biennial  budget 
and appropriations process and engage inmulti-year  authorizations. 
In particular,  the best  reform  of  this  type  seems  to  involve  a 
cycle  that locates budget  submission, approval and appropriations 
activities  in one  session  of  Congress,  and  devotes  the other  to 
analysis,  oversight  and planning.36 
The  two-year  cycle  is  likely  to  offer  a  significant 
improvement  over  our present  federal budgeting  system.  Although 29 
use  of  supplementals  and  other  budget  adjustments  may  increase 
somewhat,  a  streamlined  budget  process  should  reduce  much 
procedural  repetition  and  lessen  overall  budget  work.  Biennial 
budgets might also help make federal policies more effective  -- not 
only by allowing more time for management and oversight but also by 
both encouraging  long-range planning and facilitating  efforts that 
can bring  greater  coherence  to government  action.  In addition, 
such budgets  are likely to promote  economic stability.37  Two-year 
budgets  might  even  make  a  small  contribution  to  the  goals  of 
reducing  the  federal  deficit  and  extending  the  time horizons  of 
actors  in America's  private  sector. 
Biennial  budgeting  is  not  a panacea.  An  effective  budget 
process involves more than the budget period and timeline.  It also 
requires intelligent budget preparation,  execution, management  and 
auditing.38  And  even  the best  public-budgeting  system  will  only 
produce  good results  if participants  are willing  to adhere  to the 
process  and are committed  to its successful operation.  Moreover, 
the budget  is  inevitably  both  a  source  and product  of political 
conflict  -- a fact that remains regardless of procedure. 
Still,  while  a  two-year  budget  may  be  a  small  step,  it  is 
nevertheless  a step in the right direction for a nation seeking  to 
llre-inventtt  government.  A January 1, 1994 National Journal article 
on  public-sector  reform  stated  that members  of  Congress  "showed 
more interest in talk than in action" during 1993, and predicted  -- 
accurately  --  that "more of the same" was in store for 1994  [Cohen 
1994,  331.  Citizens  interested  in a government  that really  does 30 
'work better and cost less' must hope that the 104th Congress will 
bring  to Washington  a greater  interest in action. 
Endnotes 
1.  While budgeting  involves many phases  -- including preparation 
and submission, approval  (including  appropriations), execution, and 
audit  --  most recent discussions of budgeting  in the United States 
have  focused  on the transition  from submission  to approval.  The 
1974 Budget Act outlined  the following timetable  for this portion 
of the process: 
On or Before 
November  10 
15th day after 
Congress meets 
March  15 
April  1 
April  15 
May 15 
May 15 
7th day after 
Labor Day 
September  15 
Action 
President submits current  services 
budget 
President  submits the annual budget 
Congressional  committees  submit views 
and estimates to budget  committees 
Congressional  Budget Office  submits  its 
annual report to budget  committees 
Budget committees  report first 
concurrent  resolution  to their house 
Committees  report bills and resolutions 
authorizing  new budget  authority 
Congress completes action on first 
concurrent  resolution on the budget 
Congress completes action on bills and 
resolutions providing  new budget 
authority  and new spending authority 
Congress completes  action on second 
required concurrent  resolution  on the 
budget 31 
September  25  Congress completes action on 
reconciliation  bill or resolution,  or 
both, implementing  second concurrent 
resolution 
October  1  Fiscal year begins. 
Despite  some subsequent  changes,  the preceding  timetable provides 
a roughly accurate description of the present process.  For more on 
public  budgeting  in general  and federal budgeting  in particular, 
see Lee and Johnson  [1983] and Shuman  [19881, respectively. 
2.  According  to  J.  Wilner  Sundelson's  [19351  "Budgetary 
Principles,"  there is little reason why the year was  taken as the 
normal  budget  unit  except  that it corresponds  with  the customary 
measure  of human  calculation  -- a measure  especially  appropriate 
for an agriculturally-oriented  society.  Many U.S. states, however, 
have  adopted  biennial  budgets  in  part  due  to  their  history  of 
convening  legislatures  every other year.  While a large number of 
states  moved  to  annual  budgets  in  recent  decades,  the  past  few 
years have seen a revival of state interest in two-year budgeting. 
In particular, Nebraska and Connecticut adopted two year budgets in 
1987  and  1992,  respectively;  and  Michigan  has  given  serious 
attention to the matter during the past year.  Today 20 states have 
biennial  budgets  (13 have annual legislative  sessions). 
3.  The  t'current  services  budget"  (or "baseline  budget")  is  an 
estimate that the President is required to submit to Congress under 
the  1974  Budget  Act.  It  projects  the  level  of  spending  and 
revenues  that would  result if existing programs  and policies  were 
continued  unchanged  during  the next  five fiscal years  ("with all 
programs adjusted for inflation so that existing levels of activity 32 
are maintained")  [Shuman 1988, 3101. 
4.  Ford's 1983 bill did not differ significantly from his original 
(1981) proposal.  It should be noted,  however,  that Panetta  had 
eliminated  the second budget resolution from his bill by 1983  [AEI 
1983, 61.  This change was made in the wake of a 1981 congressional 
decision to include reconciliation instructions in the first budget 
resolution. 
5.  According  to Susan Irving  [1993, 11 of the General Accounting 
Office,  Presidents  Ronald  Reagan  and George  Bush also called  for 
biennial budgeting.  Michael Boskin, Bush's chief economic adviser, 
expressed  support  for multi-year  budgeting  in a 1986  Wall Street 
Journal  editorial  [Boskin 19861. 
6.  Three  notes  are warranted  at this point.  First,  in her  1989 
book on U.S. budgeting, Annette Meyer writes that of the nearly 20 
budget-process  reforms  proposed  during  the  198Os,  biennial 
budgeting  "has  received  the  most  attention  in  Congress"  [Meyer 
1989, 1591.  Second, a 1989 GAO report indicates that at the end of 
April 1989, six biennial budgeting bills had been introduced to the 
10lst Congress.  Three proposals would assign most or all budgeting 
activities  to a  single  congressional  session  (like the Roth  and 
Hutto  bills  discussed  in  this  paper);  two  would  stretch  the 
budgeting  process over two years  (like the Panetta and Ford bills 
discussed  above); and one would  retains annual appropriations  but 
called  for  'Ia  macro-level  joint  budget  resolution  in  the  first 
session of a CongressI' [General Accounting  Office  (GAO) 1989a, 21 
Finally, for evidence that the various individuals mentioned  in the 33 
text above are supports of biennial budgeting,  see:  House  119871; 
Kilborn  [1988, All;  Weidenbaum  11988, 58-591;  Wildavsky  [1988, 
4141;  "Lawmakers  Back  Two-Year  Budget  Concept"  119891;  Lynch 
[19891;  National Economic  Commission  11989,  811;  "One Budget  Reform 
Step that Would Pay a Double Dividend"  11987, 801;  Robb  119911; "At 
a GlanceIt [19941. 
7.  In fact, some scholars and legislators have suggested even more 
varied proposals,  including  those that call for a two-year budget 
period  with  annual  appropriations  (some making  this  suggestion 
advocate detailed biennial budget  resolutions while others call for 
only broad,  ltmacro-levelll  budget decisions), and a biennial period 
with one year devoted  to operating budget decisions  and the other 
devoted  to capital budget  decisions  [AEI 1983,  12-13; GAO  1989b, 
27; Lynch  1989, 501. 
8.  The major state-level studies considered in this work are:  GAO 
[1987; 19821; Bowsher  [19841;  Wiggins and Hamm  [19841; and Council 
of  State Governments  [19721.  Also  relied on are Eckl  [19931 and 
Snell  [19931.  In addition  to state experience,  one might wish  to 
consider  federal  experience  with biennial  budgeting.  There  are, 
unfortunately,  few federal experiments and fewer analyses of their 
results.  The NPR report and an earlier General Accounting  Office 
(GAO) study both refer to the 1987 agreement between the President 
and  Congress  -- which  set  spending  levels  for major  programs  in 
fiscal  years  1988  and  1989  -- as  a  success  [NPR 1933,  17;  GAO 
198933,  271.  Both reports also note that Congress has directed  the 
Department  of Defense to submit two-year budgets  for 1988-1989 and 34 
beyond.  However, authorization committees have not approved a full 
two-year  defense  budget,  and  appropriations  committees  have  not 
provided second-year funding  [Irving 1993, 51.  According to Robert 
J. Art,  a scholar  specializing  in defense  issues,  the Pentagon's 
first biennial budget was a "half success11  -- it yielded  "no payoff 
for program  stability but a great deal of programmatic  and policy 
oversight"  [Art 1989, 2081. 
An examination  of whether  the public  sector in other nations 
offers any lessons on this topic might also be valuable.  That type 
of exploration,  however,  is beyond  the scope of the present work. 
9.  Two excellent sources of a range of views on biennial budgeting 
are  reports  issued  by  the  House  of  Representatives  [19931  and 
Senate  119901. 
10.  Of course,  political  views will  sometimes be more  polarized 
than  at other  times,  leading  to variability  in the  intensity  of 
budget  conflict. 
11.  See,  for  example,  Irving  [19931 and  testimony  by Thomas  E. 
Mann of the Brookings  Institution  in House  [1993, 701. 
12.  Robert Reischauer  is presently  the director of the CBO.  The 
aforementioned  statement was made by Reischauer  in 1982, while he 
served as senior vice-president  of the Urban Institute. 
13.  For an example of this perspective,  see the remarks by former 
CBO director  Rudolph  Penner in Kilborn  [1988, B81. 
14.  In  a  letter  to  the  author  dated  August  2, 
reiterated  her support for biennial budgeting  [Rivl 
1993,  Rivlin 
in 1993  'I  . 35 
15.  Among  the many  budget  deadlines  missed  often  is passage  of 
appropriations  legislation by the start of the fiscal year.  Since 
1975, Congress and the White House have met this October 1 deadline 
only twice. 
16.  A National Journal article from January 1994 provides evidence 
that congressional  support  for biennial  budgeting  remains  strong 
[Cohen 1994, 331. 
17.  The report issued on the hearings mentioned  above, Reform  of 
the Federal Budget Process:  An Analysis of Major Proposals, qUOteS 
from remarks of one participant  (a  supporter of biennial  budgeting) 
who believed that supplemental appropriations and rescissions would 
"limit somewhat the expected benefit of increased efficiency" under 
a two-year budget system  [House 1987, 891.  Yet the report does not 
indicate  that any participant  rejected  the argument  that biennial 
budgets would  reduce the overall  time devoted  to budgeting. 
18.  The GAO  reports  that many  respondents  in states moving  from 
biennial  budgets  saw problems  in the change,  including  the  fact 
that annual budgeting  "requires the almost continual  involvement of 
agency  and  budget  division  staff  in  budget  formulation  to  the 
detriment  of effective budget  execution and program  analysisI'  and 
that  it  "requires  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  to use 
extensive resources to prepare and approve budgets"  [GAO  1987, 131. 
19.  A study conducted by the Council of State Governments  (CSG) in 
1972 yielded  a number of findings similar to those of the 1989 GAO 
report  -- as did  a  small-scale  GAO  study published  in  1982  [CSG 
1972;  GAO  19821.  Moreover,  recent  reports  by  the  National 36 
Conference  of  State  Legislatures  (NCSL)  indicate  that  state 
officials  continue  to  see  the  streamlined  nature  of  a  biennial 
process  as  an advantage  over  annual  budgeting  [Snell 1993;  Eckl 
19931.  AS  Ronald  Snell writes,  a  "major advantage"  of biennial 
budgeting  is  that  it is  "less expensive  and  time  consuming  than 
that of  annual  budgeting"  [Snell 1993,  101.  This  is especially 
significant  when  one recalls  that nearly  all  states must  balance 
their budgets  -- a fact that could  lead to the need  for off-year 
changes. 
20.  For more  recent  expressions  of the same view 
budgeting  process,  see Nunn  11992, 81  and Domenici 
of the current 
[1992, 341. 
21.  The need for budget  reform was reiterated by the GAO in 1988 
[Bowsher 19881  and more  recently  in a  1992 document  which  noted 
that changes in the budget process "are necessary to facilitate and 
encourage  focus on  the long-term  consequences  of decisions"  [GAO 
1992,  161.  While  there  is  some  evidence  that  formal  oversight 
activity  increased significantly  since the early 197Os, the author 
of that study  acknowledges  that most  scholars  agree  the quantity 
and  quality  of  contemporary  oversight  is  inadequate  [Aberbach 
19901. 
22.  Some support for this view on long-range planning can be found 
in Wiggins  and Hamm  [1984, III-15 and V-121. 
23.  In  1993  congressional  testimony  on biennial  budgeting,  CBO 
director Reischauer makes the following point which complements  the 
statement by Rivlin found above:  l'[Clontracts  between  the federal 
government  and private  contractors  might  be  negotiated  at  terms 37 
more  favorable  to the government  if more  stable  funding  could be 
guaranteed"  [Reischauer 1993, 61. 
24.  On  the matter  of  indexing,  Ford has  commented,  "Indexing  a 
two-year budget has got to be less inflationary  than adjusting  at 
the end of each year"  [Ford 1981, 289531. 
25.  For  a  discussion  of  Big  Government  capitalism,  see  Minsky 
[19861. 
26.  For more on the Itchronic  myopia" of America's economic aCtOX, 
see  Jacobs  [19911. 
27.  For views similar to Panetta's, see AEI  [1983, 163 and Rivlin 
[1981, 371. 
28.  It is interesting  to note that in a 1987 survey of officials 
in two states that had moved to biennial budgeting, GAO researchers 
found  evidence  that  the move  may have  actually  had  no  impact  on 
supplementals and other budgetary adjustments  [GAO  1987, 251. While 
this  finding by  itself  is an insecure  foundation  for suggestions 
regarding likely federal-level outcomes, it indicates that biennial 
budgeting  does  not  guarantee  a  flood  of  off-year  adjustments. 
Moreover,  officials 
choosing  to require a 
enactment. 
can  help  discourage  such  adjustments  by 
V1super  majorityI' (of three-fifths)  for their 
29.  A concern related to the one mentioned above is that Congress 
might  respond  to the change to biennial budgeting  by writing  even 
more  "micromanagement"  provisions  for  agencies  [Meyers 1988,  p. 
291.  But  the  state-level  study  by Wiggins  and  Hamm  finds  that 
"legislators appear to write more specific program objectives  into 38 
appropriations  bills  when using  annual budgets"  Wiggins  and Hamm 
11984, 111-271. 
30.  A  related  concern  regarding  the difficulty  of  apportioning 
funds over a two-year period might be addressed by providing  (once 
every  two  years)  separate  appropriations  for  each  year  of  the 
budget period.  This arrangement, combined with greater oversight, 
could reduce agency efforts to increase budget padding.  Moreover, 
a survey-based  study of state experiences  conducted  for the Texas 
House Appropriations  Committee  suggests that agency cushions  in a 
biennial  budgeting  environment  are not necessarily  higher  than in 
a system with annual budgets  [Wiggins and Hamm, 1984, III-14 and V- 
61. 
31.  While  a  biennial  budget  and  appropriations  cycle  may  not 
reduce  congressional  control  over  the  executive  branch,  power 
relations  within  the  legislature  may  indeed  be  altered  by  this 
process  reform.  This may explain, for example, why members of the 
appropriations  committees  "have never been  crazy  about  the idea" 
[Rauch 1986, 23191. 
32.  While  recent testimony by Reischauer  suggested  that biennial 
budgeting  should be implemented only  l'once  the deficit problem  is 
behind  us," his view  is similar to the one expressed  in the text 
above  in that he writes  of 
a  trade-off  between  the ability  of  agencies  to manage 
programs  and recipients  of federal aid  to plan  for the 
future, on the one hand, and the ability of Congress  to 
control the budget and make more frequent changes in it, 39 
on the other  [Reischauer 1993, 51. 
Rivlin  has  gone  even  a  step  further  and  suggested  that  Congress 
"can  contribute  more  to  changing  the  future  of  the  nation  by 
directing overall policy, than by controlling details."  She argues 
that Congress would do better by aspiring "to be an effective board 
of  directors,  rather  than  an  ineffective  national  management" 
[Rivlin 1984, 1351. 
33.  During  the  same  hearings,  Reischauer  [1993, 131  expressed 
similar  concerns  regarding  a  system  that  would  require  a  new 
President or Congress to wait longer than one year to put in place 
a new budget. 
34.  In  fact,  one  should  remember  that  a  common  argument  of 
biennial-budgeting  opponents  is  that budget  adjustments  will  be 
frequent.  Studies  on  state  experience,  meanwhile,  are not  very 
instructive  on this matter.  While  some states shifting  to annual 
budgets  indicated  that the move was undertaken  to obtain  greater 
flexibility,  we  find  in  two  of  three  studies  that  states  with 
biennial  systems  did  not  indicate  flexibility  was  a  problem  in 
their system  [GAO 1987; Bowsher  1984; and CSG 19721. 
35.  A recent  GAO report agrees with Rivlin on the need  for more 
policy planning:  "At the macroeconomic  level, the budget process 
needs to adopt a longer term planning horizon linking fiscal policy 
with broader goals for the performance of the economy."  Long-term 
economic  goals  (such as  real GNP  growth),  the  report  continues, 
"should become  the focus of policymaking  which  should  then drive 
subsequent fiscal policy choices needed to attain these goalsI'  [GAO 40 
1992,  161. 
Also, a 1988  report by Bowsher notes that while  the existing 
budget  process  is highly  flexible,  this  flexibility  comes  "at a 
high  price."  In particular,  he writes  that present  arrangements 
"invite  revisitings  of  the  issues  and  make  the  budget  process 
vulnerable  to  extraneous  and  time-consuming  delays."  His 
conclusion:  1'1  think  that  this  gives  members  of  Congress  the 
feeling that the budget process is out of control and never-ending" 
[Bowsher 1988,  111. 
36.  Action  on  authorizations  could  be  taken  during  either 
congressional  session. 
37.  As mentioned  previously,  some opponents  are  concerned  that 
two-year  budgeting  will  lead  to  problems  caused  by  reduced 
flexibility,  while  others  suggest  it will  fail  due  to  increased 
reliance on budget  adjustments.  The reality seems more  likely to 
be found somewhere between these extremes.  In particular, biennial 
budgeting  seems  likely  to  provide  a  well-balanced  process  that 
fosters  increased  stability  while  retaining  a  degree  of  budget 
flexibility. 
38.  For  a  number  of  suggestions  designed  to  improve  federal 
budgeting, see Bowsher  [19841;  Rivlin  [19841;  Domenici  [19871;  Haas 
E19871; GAO  [1989bl; Gore  [1993]; and NPR  [19931. 41 
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